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TRUSTS AND ESTATES - POUR-OVER WILLS - BEQUEST TO SUBSEQUENTLY• 
AMENDED TRUST UPHELD UNDER Doc:num: OF INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE -
Testator created an inter vivos trust, reserving a power to amend or revoke. 
Thereafter, he executed his will which left the residue of his estate to the 
trustee to be used according to the terms of the trust. Subsequently, testa-
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tor executed an unattested instrument which altered the beneficial interests 
in the trust property. At testator's death, his executor petitioned the 
probate court for instructions whether the residue passed according to the 
trust's original terms, its amended terms, or whether the bequest failed, 
resulting in intestacy. On certification1 to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, held, there was an effective disposition to the trustee to hold 
subject to the terms of the trust as amended. The subsequent amendment 
was effective because acts of independent significance do not require at-
testation under the statute of wills. Second Bank - State St. Trust Co. v. 
Pinion, 170 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 1960). 
This is the first decision of its kind. Absent the aid of a statute, be-
quests had previously been upheld only in accordance with the terms of 
the trust as it was written when the will was executed2 or held entirely 
invalid.a Later amendments to the trust, when executed in compliance 
with the statute of wills, have been given effect as to property passing under 
the will.4 But until now there has been no decision (at least unaided by a 
statute) squarely holding that the willed assets could pass according to the 
dispositive terms of an unattested amendment made after the will.5 In so 
doing the court based its decision upon the doctrine of independent sig-
nificance.a This doctrine has long been recognized as a means of effectuat-
ing bequests which refer to nontestamentary acts or writings in order to 
identify a legatee or the subject matter of a gift.7 Reference may safely be 
1 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 13 (1955) authorizes a judge of probate court to 
reserve and report the evidence and all questions of law for consideration of the full 
court, as if on appeal. 
2 See Edward's Will Trusts, [1948] 1 Cb. 440; cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 
291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935); Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 
N.E. 419 (1934). See generally Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an 
Inter Vivos Trust, 50 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1951); Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 81 (1958). 
3 Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 
257 U.S. 661 (1922); President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 
174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940). Where the trust has not been amended, most courts would 
hold the mere power to amend insufficient to defeat the bequests. See, e.g., In the Matter 
of the Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. I, 60 Pac. 471 (1900); In re Irvie's Will, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 
N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958); In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953); 
cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, supra note 2; Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 
294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928). Contra, Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., supra. 
4Stouse v. First Nat'! Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951). 
5 In re Irvie's ·will, supra note 3, which upheld a bequest to an amended trust where 
the amendments were merely administrative in nature, apparently under the doctrine of 
incorporation by reference. But see Estate of Steck, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957) 
which gave effect to subsequent amendments but without raising the issue of the validity 
of the amendments. 
o Sometimes called "reference to nontestamentary acts" by courts and writers. 
7 One of the earliest cases applying the doctrine is Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 My. &: Cr. 507, 
40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838), where the court upheld a bequest to be divided "amongst 
[testatrix's] ••• partners who should be in copartnership with her at the time of her 
decease, or to whom she might have disposed of her business." See Dennis v. Holsapple, 
148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631 (1897) (gift to "whoever shall take good care of me, and 
maintain, nurse, clothe and furnish me with proper medical treatment"); Gaff v. Corn-
wallis, 219 Mass. 226, 106 N.E. 860 (1914) (gift of "the contents, if any, of a drawer in 
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made to such extrinsic acts or writings, notwithstanding their lack of 
formality, because their nontestamentary character reduces the likelihood 
of fraud; thus this approach is consistent with the underlying purpose of 
the statute of wills. However, many courts have invalidated amendments 
made after the execution of the will by applying the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference, a doctrine under which testamentary effect is not given 
to an extrinsic document unless it was already in existence when the will 
was executed.s But incorporation by reference should not be applied to a 
bequest conveying assets owned at death to the corpus of an inter vivos 
trust unless it is clear that the testator meant to create a separate testamen-
tary trust.9 In the absence of such evidence, it should be presumed that the 
testator intends to add his probate property to the previously-established 
inter vivos trust. Insofar as the amendment affects trust as well as probate 
property, it has significance independent of the disposition of the property 
o,;med at death. In the principal case, the trust amendment certainly has 
as much independent significance as would a subsequent change in the 
contents of a safe deposit box, an act which would not invalidate a bequest 
of the contents of the box.1° Consequently, the trust amendment was quite 
properly held valid. 
The use of Pour-over wills has been urged by legal writers11 because it 
permits the unified administration of trust and probate property, minimizes 
administrative expense, avoids the continued court supervision and ac-
counting required of a testamentary trustee, and allows greater flexibility 
in the disposition of probate property. In many states, the result reached 
by the principal case has been accomplished by statutes which make dis-
said safe"); Lear v. Manser, 114 Me. 342, 96 Atl. 240 (1916) (gift to "such person or per-
sons ... as shall care for me in my last sickness"); Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N.H. 94, 88 Atl. 98 
(1913) (gift to testator's employees at date of death); In re Reinheimer's Estate, 265 Pa. 
185, 108 Atl. 412 (1919) (gift to "the party or parties .•. who may be fanning my farm 
and taking care of me at the time of my death''). 
s See Anvood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., supra note 3; President and Directors 
of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, supra note 3. For a complete discussion of the 1:11/'o doctrines 
and of cases applying each, see McClanahan, Bequests to, an Existing Trust, 47 CALIF. L. 
REv. 267 (1959); Palmer, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2. 
9 The residuary clause of the trust involved in the principal case provided that the 
assets distributed to the trustee were to be "held, administered and distributed solely 
under the provisions of such indenture and in no way as trustee under this will. •.. " 
The court concluded that this language rendered incorporation by reference inapplicable. 
Principal case at 351. 
10 Gaff v. Cornwallis, supra note 7. 
11 See I Scon, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed 1956); Evans, Non testamentary Acts and In-
corporation by Reference, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 635 (1949); McClanahan, supra :note 8; 
Palmer, supra note 2; Polasky, Pour-Over Wills, 98 TRUSTS & EsrATF-5 949 (1959); Shattuck, 
Some Practical Aspects of the Problems of the Alterable and Revocable Inter Vivos Trust 
in Massachusetts, 26 B.U.L. REv. 437 (1946). But see Lauritzen, Pour-Over Wills, 95 
TRUSTS & EsrATF-5 992 (1956); Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust Be Incorporated by Ref-
erence? 45 ILL. L. REv. 583 (1950). 
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positions to an existing trust valid.12 Undoubtedly, the result will lead to 
greater utilization of the pour-over device by removing the uncertainty 
over the validity of trust amendments made after the execution of the 
pour-over will. 
The decision in the principal case does not reach the situation where a 
testator leaves property to another person's inter vivos trust. For instance, 
if a wife's will leaves the residue of her estate to her husband's inter vivos 
trust in which he has reserved a power to amend or revolte and the husband 
amends the terms of the trust after his wife's death, the question arises 
whether the amendment can also control the disposition of her probate 
property. Although the requisite independent significance is still present, 
a court may conclude that the wife did not intend to give her husband such 
unrestricted control over her probate property.13 This conclusion would 
be unfortunate for it would require the wife's property to be separately 
administered and thereby forfeit the advantages of the pour-over will. It 
is just as likely that a person leaving property to another's amendable trust 
would have no intention of restricting the settlor's power. This would 
especially be true in the husband and wife situation. I£ a court was in-
clined to uphold the subsequent amendment, it could do so by analogizing 
the wife's bequest to her husband's amendable and revocable trust with a 
bequest to him of a general power of appointment.14 The fact that a 
testator who intends to create such a power usually does so in express terms 
should not preclude the court from invoking this analogy when the rela-
tionship of the parties or other circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the will suggest that the wife intended to give her husband this control 
over her probate property. 
David Finkleman 
12 S.B. No. 116, Reg. Sess. (Ariz. March 22, 1961); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-5-45 
(Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 286); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 111 (Supp. 1960); FLA. STAT. § 736.17 
(Supp. 1960); Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 194{a) (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601 (j) (1953); 
Mn. ANN. ConE art. 93, § 350A (Supp. 1960); MISS. CODE ANN. § 661.5 (Supp. 1960); MONT. 
R.Ev. CODF.S ANN. § 91-321 (Supp. 1961); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-1806 (Supp. 1959); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 31-47 (Supp. 1959); H.B. No. 915, Reg. Sess. (N.D., March 14, 1961); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(a) (Supp. 1960); Rl. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 33-6-33 (Supp. 1960); 
Ch. 303, Reg. Sess. (Tenn., March 17, 1961); S.B. No. 140, Reg. Sess. (Texas, March 25, 
1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.1 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.12.250 (1959); Wvo. 
STAT. ANN. § 2-53 (1957). 
13 Such a result would undoubtedly be reached under the Uniform Testamentary 
Additions to Trusts Act § 1 which requires an authorization in the will in order to 
validate amendments made after testator's death. 
14 Cf. Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 35 A.2d 299 (1944). However, the draftsman 
should be aware of the estate tax consequences of giving the settlor of the inter vivos trust 
the power to control the testator's probate assets. The power to amend or revoke the 
trust would probably qualify as a general power of appointment, resulting in the inclu-
sion of the testator's probate assets in the estate of the settlor. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954. 
§ 2041 (a) (2). 
